Author :
Abstract
Mobil telekomünikasyon piyasasında bir operatörün diğer operatör abonelerinden gelen aramaları kendi abonelerine ulaştırması karşılığında talep ettiği mobil arabağlantı ücretleri (MTR) piyasa yapısını şekillendiren önemli bir dinamiktir. Her operatörün kendi ağında arabağlantı açısından monopol olması bu ücretlerin rekabetçi fiyatlardan uzak belirlenebilmesine olanak sağlamaktadır. Düzenleyici otoriteler MRT’yi sosyal ve iktisadi beklentilerine uygun etkiler göstermesi için zaman zaman çeşitli yöntemlerle merkezi olarak belirleme ya da bu ücretlere çeşitli sınırlar çizme yoluna gitmektedir. Ancak literatürde merkezi bir düzenleme ile arabağlantı ücretlerinde yapılacak indirimin ‘‘su yatağı etkisi (the waterbed effect)” göstererek beklenin aksine abonelerin daha yüksek fiyatlarla karşı karşıya kalmasına neden olabileceği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu çalışmada 2007-2017 dönemine ait çeyrek yıllık veriler kullanılarak Türkiye Mobil Telekomünikasyon Piyasası’nda MTR’deki düzenlemelerin piyasa fiyatına etkisi incelenmektedir. Dinamik ortak korelasyonlu etkiler (DCCE) tahmincisi’ne dayalı sonuçlar MTR düzenlemelerinin daha yüksek fiyatlara aracılık etmediğini ve ilgili dönemde su yatağı etkisinin oluşmadığını ortaya konmaktadır.
Keywords
Abstract
In mobile telecommunication markets mobile termination rates (MTR), which has charged by an operator for delivering calls from other operator subscribers to their own subscribers, is an important dynamic shaping the market structure. The fact that each operator is monopolized in terms of interconnection in their own network allows these rates to be determined away from competitive prices. Regulatory authorities occasionally seek to centrally determine these rates or draw various boundaries to these rates with a variety of methods to ensure that MTR are compatible with their social and economic expectations. However it is suggested that a discount on termination rates by a central arrangement could lead to the "waterbed effect", which may unexpectedly lead to higher prices for the subscriber in the literature. In this paper, using the quarterly data for the period 2007-2017 the effect of MTR regulations on market prices is examined in the Turkish Mobile Telecommunications Market. The results, based on the dynamic common correlated effects (DCCE) estimator, which suggests that MTR regulations do not lead to higher prices and the waterbed effect does not occur in Turkish Mobile Telecommunications Market for the related period.
Keywords
- Aoki, R., & Small, J. (1999). “The economics of number portability: Switching costs and two part tariffs”,
- Aoki, R., & Small, J. (1999). “The economics of number portability: Switching costs and two part tariffs”, Working paper, New Zealand: University of Auckland.
- Armstrong, M. (1998). “Network interconnection in telecommunications”, Economic Journal, 108(448): 545–564.
- Armstrong, M. & Wright, J. (2009). “Mobile call termination”, Economic Journal, 119(538): 270– 307.
- Baltagi, B. H., Feng, Q. & Kao, C. (2012). “A Lagrange multiplier test for cross-sectional dependence in a fixed effects panel data model”, Journal of Econometrics, 170:164-177.
- Binmore, K. & Harbord D. (2005). “Bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates: Countervailing buyer Power as a constraint on monopoly power”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 1:449– 472.
- Bond, S.R. & Eberhart M. (2009). “Cross-sectional dependence in non-stationary panel models: A novel estimator” Nordic Econometric Meetings, Sweeden.
- Bodammer, I. (2009). “The waterbed effect explained in relation to roaming: An economicsperspective”,https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/presentation/b4b0/c54778e65ec0e866fd2fd9611242688c8ad5.p df (Erişim Tarihi, 20 Mayıs 2018).
- Breusch, T. S. & Pagan, A. R. (1980). “The lagrange multiplier test and its applications to model specification in econometrics”, The Review of Economic Studies, 47(1):239-253.
- Carter, M. & Wright, J. (2003). “Asymmetric network interconnection”, Review of Industrial Organization, 22(1):27–46.
- Channer, E. L. (2010). “Staff opinion on the competitive dynamics of call termination provision.Staff Report”, Fair Trading Commission. https://jftc.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Competitive- Dynamics-of-Call-Termination-Provision.pdf (Erişim Tarihi, 10 Mayıs 2018).
- Cho, D., Ferreira, P., & Telang, R. (2013). “The impact of mobile number portability on price, competition and consumer welfare”, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265104
- Chudik, A & Pesaran M.H. (2015). “Common correlated effects estimation of heterogeneous dynamic panel data models with weakly exogenous regressors”, Journal of Econometrics, 188:393-420.
- Cunningham, B.M., Alexander, P.J. & Candeub, A. (2010). “Network growth: theory and evidence from the mobile telephone industry”, Information Economics and Policy, 22(1):91-102.
- Dickey, D. A. & Fuller, W. A. (1979). “Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74:427-431.
- Dobson, P. & Inderst, R. (2007). “Differential buyer power and the waterbed effect: Do strong buyers benefit or harm consumers?”, European Competition Law Review. 28.
- Eberhart, M. & Teal F. (2010). Productivity analysis in the global manufacturing production, Department of Economics, University of Oxford.
- Economides, N. & White, L. J. (1995). “Access and interconnection pricing: How efficient is the "efficient Component Pricing Rule"?”, NYU Stern School of Business EC-95-04; Antitrust Bulletin.
- European Commission (2009). “Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatmentof Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU”, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/recomm_guidelines.
- Foros, O. & Steen, F (2007). “SMP-analysis of the Swedish market for call termination on mobile networks”, Report commissioned by Tele2 Sverige AB.
- Gans, J. & King, S. (2000). “Mobile network competition, consumer ignorance and fixed-to-mobile call prices”, Information Economics and Policy, 12(4):301–27.
- Gans, J., & King S. (2001). “Using 'bill and keep' interconnect agreements to soften network competition”, Economics Letters, 71(3):413- 420.
- Genakos, C. & Valletti, T. (2011). “Testing the ‘waterbed’ effect in mobile telecommunications”, Journal of the European Economic Association. 9(6):1114–42.
- Genakos, C. & Valletti T. (2015). “Evaluating a decade of mobile termination rate regulation”, Economic Journal, 125(586).
- Growitsch, C., Marcus, J.S. & Wernick, C. (2010). “The effects of lower mobile termination rates (MTRs) on retail price and demand”, Communications and Strategies, 80:119-140.
- Harbord, D. & Pagnozzi, M. (2010). “Network-based price discrimination and ‘bill-and-keep’ vs. ‘cost- based-regulation of mobile termination rates”, Review of Network Economics. 9(1).
- Harbord, D. & Hoernig, S. (2015). “Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the U.K.”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 63 (4):673–703.
- Hoernig, S., Inderst, R. & Valletti, T. (2014). “Calling circles: network competition with non-uniform calling patterns”, RAND Journal of Economics, 45(1):155–75.
- Hurkens, S. & Lopez, A.L. (2014). “Mobile termination, network externalities and consumer expectations”, The Economic Journal, 124 (579):1005-1039.
- Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H. & Shin, Y. (2003). “Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 115(1):53-74.
- Karlsen, S. & Lundvall, K,. Tops, J., Olesen, H. (2008). Buyer power ın telecom: SMP assessment oftermination. Copenhagen Economics, Copenhagen, Denmark.https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/dyn/resources/Publication/publicationPDF/1/51/0/CBP__17mars_fi nalrevised.pdf.
- Laffont, J.J., Rey P. & Tirole J. (1998b). “Network competition II: Price discrimination”, RAND Journal of Economics, 29:38-56.
- Laffont, J.J., Rey P. & Tirole J. (1998a). “Network competition I: Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing”, RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1):1–37.
- Lee, J. & Lee D. H. (2012). “Asymmetry of mobile termination rates and the waterbed effect”, 23rdEuropean Regional Conference of the International Telecommunication Society, Vienna, Austria, 1-4 JulyLyons, S. (2006). “Measuring the benefits of mobile number portability”, Working Paper, Department of Economics, Trinity College, Dublin.
- Majer, T. & Pistollato, M. (2016). “Calling vs. receiving party pays: Market penetration and the importance of call externalities”, Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 17(2):150-180.
- McCloughan, P. & Lyons, S. (2006). “Accounting for ARPU: New evidence from international panel data”, Telecommunications Policy, 30(10-11):521-532.
- OECD. (2000). Mobile Phones: Pricing Structures and Trends, Information Society, Paris. Ofcom (2007). Mobile Call Termination. Statement of March 27.
- Ofcom (2009). Wholesale mobile call termination: preliminary consultation on future regulation. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/58075/mobile_call_term.pdf
- Pesaran, M. H., Smith, R.P. (1995). “Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 68 (1):79–113.
- Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., Smith, R.P. (1999). “Pooled mean group estimation of dynamic heterogeneous panels”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94 (446): 621–634.
- Pesaran, M. H. (2004). “General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels”, University of Cambridge, Working Paper, CWPE 0435.
- Pesaran, M. H. (2006). “Estimation and inference in large heterogenous panels with multifactor error structure”, Econometrica, 74:967-1012.
- Pesaran, M. H. (2007). “A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section dependence”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(2):265-312.
- Schiff, A. (2008). “The ‘waterbed’ effect and price regulation”, Review of Network Economics, 7(3):392-Shi, M., Chiang, J. & Rhee, B. D. (2006). “Price competition with reduced consumer switching costs: Thecase of ‘‘wireless number portability’’ in the cellular phone industry”, Management Science, 52(1): 27–38.
- Shy, O. (2002). “A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(1):71-87.
- Swamy, P. (1971). Statistical Inference in Random Coefficient Regression Models, New York: Springer. Tatoğlu, F.Y. (2017). Panel zaman serileri analizi, İstanbul:Beta Yayınları.
- Tetrault, M. (2000). Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, Module 3, https://www.itu.int/ITU- D/treg/Documentation/Infodev_handbook/3_Interconnection.pdf.
- Townsend, D. (2001). Economic and financial terms of interconnection, ITU Workshop on Interconnection, Sanya City, China. https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/papers/2001/china/22-Document%208.pdf.
- Viard, V. B. (2007). “Do switching costs make markets more or less competitive? The case of 800 number portability”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 38(1):146-163.
- Walden, I. & Angel, J. (2001). Telecommunications Law, London; Blackstone Press.
- Westerlund, J. (2007). “Testing for error correction in panel data”, Oxford Bulletin Of Economics And Statistics, 69, 6:709-748.
