REMOTE MONITORING AND AUDITING OF HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS IN CONFLICT SETTINGS: LITERATURE REVIEW

ÇATIŞMA BÖLGELERİNDEKİ İNSANİ PROGRAMLARIN UZAKTAN İZLENMESİ VE DENETLENMESİ: LİTERATÜR İNCELEMESİ

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ABSTRACT

Since 2013 many countries have been a rise in both number of conflicts and battle casualties; the number of conflicts increased from 26 to 30 between 2013 and 2014 (Gates, etc, 2016). In general humanitarian relief workers have been increasingly targeted in crisis; there were 110 attacks on relief workers in 2014, resulting in 121 deaths. International actors are preferred as kidnapping victims as they provide both a higher ransom and a more visible political statement (Stoddard, etc, 2009). The need to maximize the safety of staff results in miniature access for humanitarian programming and monitoring. The restrictions imposed by both governments and non-state actors who are seeking to exercise control over territories making the access to reach very limited; The researchers see a direct correlation between increasing violence and shrinking humanitarian presence (Stoddard, etc, 2014).

When the dangerous to international organizations working in conflict zones becomes highly or access is very limited, they are often left no other choice than to remove themselves from the situation., of course this has a harmful effect on local populations who will remain without any support. Then remote programming will be the most alternative to 'bunkerization' (Egeland, etc, 2011). It aims to continue the provision of services on the ground while it supposes that local actors are able to provide services at a reduced level of risk than that faced by international staff because they have greater knowledge of local context and more acceptance in the community. In some cases where a high risk prevents access for expatriate staff from international organizations and national staff from national organizations, remote programs are executed and managed by local actors from communities.

This literature review aims to identify these remote and auditing approaches, collating lessons learned and best practices for humanitarian programming in inaccessible conflict situations. While humanitarian programming and monitoring in inaccessible zones has been required in several recent conflicts, it is having largely been governed by trial and error due to lack of comprehensive instruction and detailed strategy. This review hopes to inform the creation of evidence to support humanitarian organizations in conflict settings.

Key words: Humanitarian Program, Remote Monitoring, Audit

1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section was completely taken from the literature and does not include the author opinions. Because this field is not developed or defined well up to now, much of the literature outlines concepts, definitions, and steps required to advance this burgeoning field (Stoddard, etc, 2006).

Tablo 1: Reference Table: Terms and Definitions

Bunkerization	The barricading of aid workers behind highly secure walls, isolating them from the populations they are serving.
INGO/IO	International Non-Governmental Organization/International Organization
International Staff	Expatriate staff from an international humanitarian organization or expatriate actors working with large national organizations
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization (Can be at national level or smaller, includes community-based organizations)
Local Actors	Humanitarian stakeholders indigenous to the location in which they are working; can be national staff, staff from local community-based organizations, or even community members.

National Staff	Humanitarian staff native to the country in which they are working, working for a national or international organization.
Proactive Strategy	Action planned as a means of preparing for a situation that has not yet taken place.
Reactive Stance	Action taken in response to a situation that has already taken place.
Remote Control	A reactive stance in response to insecurity where relocated international managers have the most responsibility, making nearly all the decisions, with limited or no delegation of authority to field staff. The risk is completely transferred to national staff, who are left to implement programs with little capacity development or transfer of skills.
Remote Management	A reactive stance in response to insecurity that involves some delegation of authority and decision-making responsibility to national implementers. There is commonly a moderate investment in capacity building for nationals and procedures in place that enable better communication, monitoring, and quality. Assumes that decision-making and authority will revert back to internationals following the restoration of security.
Remote Management Trap	The inability to transition back to traditional management after a program has been implemented remotely for some time.
Remote Operations	A general term for remote programming or monitoring. Used in this paper when the specific modality is not known .
Remote Partnership	A proactive strategy that requires equal partnership between both international and national/local staff. Each organization contributes different resources and there is a near-complete handover of responsibility and authority to local organizations. International staff often support via administration, resource mobilization, and advocacy, while the operational partner focuses on context and implementation
Remote Support	A proactive strategy that is purposefully developed with the aim of handing over authority to national/local staff in the long term. Remote managers usually take on financial and strategic oversight to ensure donor accountability, however it is up to the field implementers, who are familiar with the current context, to make decisions daily.

1.1. Causes of Remote operations

The general insecurity or a specific security incident, and restrictions on the movement of aid workers imposed by authorities in power considered as main causes for remote programs. There are many factors making an organization's have a decision to switch to remote programs, which is: the length of insecurity (it may be more feasible to temporarily shut down operations if risk is perceived as brief), the size of the program (larger programs are more difficult to handover than smaller ones), the feasibility of program activities, the capacity of local partners, and the vulnerability and need of the affected population (UNICEF EMOPS, 2011)(Rogers, 2006) (Stoddard, etc, 2006).

1.2. The Remote Operations Modalities

The remote operations are often the only choice for organizations that wish to continue their relief work in inaccessible conflict-affected locations. Remote programming and monitoring involves a shift in responsibility from international to national staff on the ground to implement the projects, while the program is managed by international staff from a secure remote location.

There are four different modalities of remote programming, varying by depth of roles and responsibilities of both international and national or local staff. They are:

- ✓ **Remote Control:** Remote control is most suitable for short-duration projects because it is a reactive stance in response to insecurity with the least amount of delegation of authority to field staff, and little capacity development or skills transfer. Such as isolated distributions in highly insecure areas It is the least sustainable of the remote operating modalities as it is highly vulnerable to staff turnover, inflexible, and tends to lack monitoring and data on the changing needs and context, all of which contribute to low quality programming. (Hansen, 2008; YCK, 2016).
- ✓ **Remote Management:** is also a reactive stance. But, it involves some delegation of authority and decision-making responsibility to national actors. There is usually a moderate investment in capacity building for nationals and procedures in place that enable better communication, monitoring, and quality. However, it is still considered temporary, and assumes that decision-making and authority will revert to international staff following the restoration of security. (Hansen, 2008; YCK, 2016).

- ✓ **Remote Support:** It is a more proactive strategy that is developed with the aim of handing over authority to national/local staff purposefully in the long term.
  Usually remote managers take on financial and strategic oversight to ensure donor accountability; but, it is up to implementers on the ground, who are familiar with the current context, to make decisions daily. This is a developmental approach with full investment in capacity building, skill transfer, mentoring, and planning. For that, it is less susceptible to disruptions. A high level of experience in the context, organizational infrastructure, and commitment to adaptability and neutrality are required for this modality (Hansen, 2008; YCK, 2016).
- ✓ **Remote Partnership:** Remote partnership is also a proactive modality but means an equal partnership between both international and national/local organizations and actors. Each organization contributes different resources and there is a near-complete handover of responsibility and authority to local organizations. The support from International staff will be as administration, resource mobilization, and advocacy, while the operational partner focuses on context and implementation. The international partner is unlikely to engage in capacity development, as the local partner would already need to have significant internal capacity for the partnership to function. Although this modality beneficial for sustainability and adapting to the changing context, it can be difficult to ensure equitable status between partners and funding due to donor reluctance (Hansen, 2008; Oxfam International and Merlin, 2009).

1.3. Other Remote Approaches

Additional approaches include community partnership arrangements, government partnership arrangements, and outsourcing to commercial contractors (Stoddard, 2006).

1.3.1. Community Partnership Arrangements

Community partnership arrangements involve an INGO/IO forming an agreement with a community wherein community leaders or a group of selected individuals implement a program in the area in which they live totally or by monitoring the program implementation. This approach is promoting community ownership and resilience against insecurity. From another side, community members can be less impartial and more susceptible to influences from family and friends; there is an increased risk of corruption and aid being selectively distributed to influential members of the community (Stoddard, etc, 2006).

Case Study 1: Community partnership in Northern Uganda (Rogers, 2006)

An anonymous NGO working in Uganda without access to their project area for a number of years looked to the community they were serving for help with programming. Through regular meetings in the neighboring town where the NGO office was located, community representatives developed program activities and implementation timelines together with the NGO. Community members took on the responsibility of program implementation (with private contractors employed for some technical components) and documented implementation using a field journal to detail various steps and activities, which were corroborated by photographs taken with a digital camera. The NGO provided support to the community implementers via supplies and training. Regular guidance and feedback was given following review of field journals and photographs, enabling the constant improvement of the project .

The community was made aware that the NGO would be monitoring activities, and independent monitors from the communities were recruited to triangulate information. However, a change in the security situation, which permitted the NGO to visit the project area with government escorts, led to the findings that this monitoring system was unreliable. Work was found to be of a low standard, and in some cases not carried out at all, despite payments being made and verification of the work by the NGO's national staff. Community members were found to be providing information that they thought the NGO wanted to hear, instead of reporting on the realities on the ground .

This case highlights both the advantages and disadvantages of relying on communities to implement projects.

1.3.2. Government Partnership Arrangements

Government partnership arrangements involve an INGO/IO developing a program in conjunction with and/or handing over an existing program to authorities. This can promote long-term development, sustainability, and

community acceptance; however, impartiality, independence, and neutrality can suffer. There is also increased risk of corruption or that the government may not have the support of the community (Stoddard, etc, 2006).

1.3.3. Outsourcing to Commercial Contractors

when an INGO/IO arranges a fee for service with a private firm or local academic institution. This is commonly for specified services such as distribution of basic provisions, but can include more complex services such as independent third-party monitoring. Benefits of this approach include neutrality and impartiality; But there are concerns about poor access to beneficiaries ((Stoddard, etc, 2006).

1.4. Remote Operations Challenges, Considerations, and Approaches

The author defined several themes in this literature review.   The themes identified are as follows: need to maintain humanitarian principles, partnerships, coordination and collaboration, acceptance, risk and risk management, advocacy, accountability, the 'remote operations trap', the need for planning and guidance, in addition to auditing. Each will be explored in detail below.

1.4.1. Need to Maintain Humanitarian Principles

It is difficult to maintain on humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which is necessary to ensure the safety of staff and communities, during remote operations. Many IOs give little consideration as to whether or not local partners seek to uphold these principles (Stoddard, etc, 2006). Neutrality can be affected through partnering with military forces to deliver aid (UNICEF EMOPS, 2011; Polio Oversight Board, 2014), while impartiality can be compromised by religious, ethnic, or political dynamics that put pressure on local staff (Stoddard, etc, 2010; Belliveau, 2013). albeit difficult, to maintain during remote operations. Humanitarian workers must increase efforts to both be and appear neutral and not align with any side of the conflict.   Impartiality can be a concern when relying on local actors who may be influenced by parties to conflict or community pressures. Capacity building on humanitarian principles is required for all national staff and partners in order to ensure the program is delivered safely and as intended.

Ensuring national and local staff have a sound understanding of humanitarian principles is necessary for programming and monitoring to be delivered in keeping with global standards (Egeland, etc, 2011).

1.4.2. Partnerships

Effective partnership is an important component of any remote operation. It is helping allow all parties to make informed choices and adequately fulfill their roles (Stoddard, etc, 2006). There are four sub-themes throughout the partnership discussion, these are: selection, capacity, communication and trust, and sustainability.

<u>Selection:</u> Selecting a suitable partner to implement remote operations requires protocols and checks in place to ensure partners have sufficient capacity and experience in the ground, and are not influenced by alternate agendas, It must be transparent and benefits from more active recruitment methods such as consulting local experts and utilizing pre-conflict networks (Stoddard, etc, 2010; Howe, etc, 2015; UNICEF EMOPS, 2011).

<u>Capacity Building:</u> It is very important to Build the capacity of local staff to ensure the fidelity of remote operations, autonomy and project ownership. In spit of, local partners may be well versed in the culture and context of a situation, they may be less adept at technical and operational activities. Training needs to include:(Operational methods/implementation, Security protocols, Negotiation skills, Monitoring and evaluation methods, Proposal writing, Advocacy, Rights and humanitarian law, Basic problem solving, and Management skills (Stoddard, etc, 2010; UNICEF EMOPS, 2011; YCK, 2012; UNHCR, 2014).

Training must take into consideration the capacities, needs, cultural and linguistic of those being trained (Stoddard, 2006). It should be prioritized before remote operations take effect and include follow-up and feedback to ensure retention and continuous improvement (Stoddard, 2010; GOAL, 2009; Oxfam International and Merlin, 2009). Trainings by local staff/non-experts are not well received (Belliveau, 2013) and LNGOs dislike top-down trainings as they are not always relevant to their needs; instead they prefer smaller trainings on mutually selected topics that are tailored to their priorities (Howe, etc, 2015). Training has also been found to be more effective when trainees shadow international staff and learn by exposure (Rogers, 2006). Monitoring of training is important to ensure standardization (CDC, 2016).

One program evaluation found that LNGOs provided with capacity building training were significantly better at meeting program outputs and quality goals compared to INGO/IOs (Stoddard, etc, 2010).

Communication and Trust: Building trust is a successful way for partnerships and is intrinsically linked to communication. A minimum level of face-to-face contact between senior staff and implementers is required to build trust and capacity. Useful trust building mechanisms include: maximizing face-to-face contact, regular sharing of ideas and information, enhanced interactions (for example, videoconferencing), transparent decision is making, and joint agenda setting, among others. A minimum level of face-to-face contact between senior staff and implementers is required to build trust and capacity (Howe etc, 2015; Norman, 20120; Balslev-Olesen, and Hüls, 2011).

Case Study 2: Partnering in Syria (Howe, and, 2015)

An examination of partnerships in Syria identified several variables that strongly influenced partnerships in this context. How an INGO/IO defines its end goal affects the relationship, with organizations who are looking for a delivery system to reach an inaccessible population fostering much different relationships than those looking to build capacity and strengthen civil society. The partnership is also affected by the INGO/IO's capacity to partner and the manner with which they approached the partnership; an organization's culture (partnerships that are streamlined into programming were found to be more effective than those viewed as a last resort), the stability of the INGO/IO within the local context (infrequent staff turnover, consistent funding, and well

defined strategies), and the donor's level of comfort with risk all influence their capacity to partner.

Partnerships in Syria were enhanced with a collaborative and trusting operative environment; a partnership with joint

problem solving between all levels, information sharing, and cooperation improves project quality and coverage. On the other hand, lack of INGO/IO support of local partners' core costs was associated with mistrust.

Sustainability: Sustainability is a growing concern where national staffs are relied upon to deliver services for increasing lengths of time. Prioritizing the sustainability of local partners involves focusing on operational and organizational capacity building of entire institutions, supporting long-term projects, providing core funds, and supporting alliances among local groups, thereby building a strong civil society (Howe, etc, 2015; UNICEF EMOPS, 2011).

Sustainability usually supported by rapid decentralization to skilled staff and flexibility in rapidly changing contexts, versus hierarchical management structures and procedures (Hansen, 2008).

1.4.3. Coordination and Collaboration

Coordination and collaboration are urgent to achieve cohesive remote programming; The structures should be rooted in the cultural context, with carefully chosen coordination and leadership bodies to promote neutrality and local ownership. There is a need for coordination mechanisms and standards, and improve the efficacy of the cluster approach for remote programming to be adapted to the realities of operating in conflict contexts (Oxfam International and Merlin, 2009).

Recommended mechanisms to improve coordination and collaboration include: best practice learning events, training and capacity building workshops, resource sharing, and engagement with humanitarian and development coordination bodies (Norman, 2012).

1.4.4. Acceptance

Acceptance is important to ensure the fidelity, and implementation, of remote operations. All activities must to be accepted by both the national/local staff implementing them and the communities they aim to serve; program ownership is linked to program success (Belliveau, 2013). Acceptance is both a security measure and used to eventually regain access (Souness, 2011; Steets, 2012) and is closely linked with trust, which is difficult to foster in situations with limited contact.

There is a thought that national staff visit locations where the program is being remotely managed will build trust between internationals and local staff in cases where the local staff have little experience in the setting (Stoddard, etc, 2006). Planned site visits by managers to the remote locations also promote project ownership (Rivas, 2015). Face-to-face communication helps both management and trust building (Stoddard, etc, 2010; UNHCR, 2014). Participatory management styles that include both national staff and communities in decision

making, planning, and implementation have a especially important as they promote acceptance and increase uptake of services (Rogers, 2006).

1.4.5. Risks and Risk Management

Risks to Local Actors: There is a false assumption that remote operations involve the transfer of risk from international to local actors, who are assumed to be at lower risk for targeting and therefore safer when implementing (GOAL, 2016; Hüls, 2011) but in real they face unique threats that are often not acknowledged in security assessments, and often do not present at trainings on security, and left with minimal security related equipment when expatriates evacuate (Egeland, etc, 2011).

Mechanisms to mitigate this risk include: Conducting thorough risk assessments (UNICEF EMOPS, 2011) (GOAL, 2016), Preparedness planning that decentralizes authority (Schreter, and Harmer, 2013), Transfer of security equipment (vehicles, communication tools, etc.) to nationals and transparent guidelines that allow them to know what they will be receiving and make informed decisions accordingly (Stoddard, etc, 2006), Employing nationals that will "blend in" (Steets, etc, 2012) and are able to maintain a low profile (Rogers, 2006), Recruitment of non-western staff from neighboring countries with similar cultures (Steets, etc, 2012) Capacity building on security issues and protocols(Stoddard and Harmer, 2010), Additional monitoring (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010), and Liaising with community members for risk updates (Norman, 2011).

General Risks: General risks in remote operations are are exacerbated by inadequate risk perception and a decreased sense of urgency from remote managers who lose touch with the situation on the ground. There are many kinds of general risk such as: inadequate and poor-quality information management, credibility, coordination, monitoring, and programming; inciting conflict; casualties and fatalities; insufficient impact; limited or no program expansion or adaptation; compromised neutrality and impartiality; corruption and fund diversion; and reduced advocacy or speaking out on behalf of affected populations. These risks are exacerbated by inadequate risk perception and a decreased sense of urgencyfrom remote managers who lose touch with the situation on the ground (Belliveau, 2013; Souness, 2011).

Organizations who are working in conflict sittings should have a general strategy for reducing risk include: building strong relationships with communities, strategic coordination with partners, and detailed monitoring, among others (Martinez-Garcia, 2014). Additionally, donor and organizational reporting requirements need to ensure they do not put national staff at increased risk and clear contingency plans are required prior to deterioration in security to maximize risk management (Howe, ect, 2015; UNICEF EMOPS, 2012).

Case Study 3: The shura (council) system in Afghanistan (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; UNHCR, 2014; Souness, 2011).

One example of effective coordination is the shura (council) system in Afghanistan developed by Tearfund to mimic the local decision

making structure based around group consultation. Following insecurity that forced coordination activities to relocate from Kandahar to Kabul, the lack of an expatriate program manager was feared to unleash tribal differences among Afghan staff members. In an attempt to preempt these tensions from causing problems, a shura was developed with the 5 program heads from the Kandahar office, each taking turns to coordinate the shura; all other staff members were invited to participate in deliberations as well. The inclusiveness to all opinions and lack of one controlling member helped to manage conflict and tensions between staff and prevented fraud or corruption as all members worked together and monitored each other .While this process was slow to develop and resulted in slow decision making initially, it was important given the cultural context and demonstrated respect for local governance mechanisms. The shura system led to programming that was highly accepted by the community, well

coordinated, and fairly implemented, while building sustainable local capacity and ownership. This system also generated meeting minutes and weekly reports that could be used for monitoring. The expatriate coordinator also benefitted by receiving multiple perspectives on any situation through individual contact with each member.

1.4.6. Advocacy

Advocacy legitimacy is highly dependent on the presence of international staff and cannot be substituted by that of local staff who carry less influence, it is closely linked to protection activities, which tend to suffer when field presence is reduced (Rivas, 2015).

1.4.7. Accountability

Accountability in remote operations includes both upward accountability to donors and downward accountability to beneficiaries, and can contribute to prioritization in these fragile and resource-limited settings (Benini,etc, 2016). The lack of field presence and direct oversight of INGO/IOs making accountability a crucial component of risk mitigation and management, with increased monitoring and reporting requirements than traditional programming. It is noticed that accountability is compromised by limited opportunities for data collection, poor quality data and inaccurate information, lack of monitoring skills and capacity of local staff, lack of good baseline data for performance indicators, issues with safely sharing information, rapid aid influxes that necessitate immediate action and prevent M&E from being built in at the onset, and difficulty gaining support from local staff who may feel money is better spent on delivery of aid (UNHCR, 2014; Jansury, ; etc, 2015; Rivas, 2015; Norman, 2012; Souness , 2011; Norman, 2011).

Upward Accountability: It is including donor accountability which is essential to ensure continued funding and confidence in programming. The focus of the majority of M&E is meeting donor accountability expectations (Stoddard, Harmer, 2010), however, these expectations are often not well suited to fragile settings, can increase risk to local partners (Howe, etc, 2015), and can detract much needed funds from programming; for that we must be flexible and realism with donors (Rivas, 2015).

Downward Accountability: It is including accountability to beneficiaries and aims to ensures the needs of target populations are being met, that aid is delivered equitably to all that require it, and that any (inadvertent) harm to beneficiaries by humanitarian actors is addressed. (GOAL, 2016; Faubert and Bhattacharjee, 2010) In remote operations as communities are unable to directly follow-up with management it will be important to have independent beneficiary accountability mechanisms (Belliveau, 2013). Monitoring of downward accountability can be achieved by: Beneficiary rapid assessment surveys (IOM, 2008), Beneficiary feedback forms (GOAL, 2016;Rivas, 2015; CDC, 2016), Beneficiary hotlines (UNHCR, 2014), Meetings and discussions with communities (Rivas, 2015; Souness, 2011) Designated "Beneficiary Reference Groups" to provide direct feedback on program and implementation quality (Stoddard, etc, 2010), Transparency of entitlements: ensuring the aid is expected and beneficiaries know what they are meant to be receiving so any large diversions are noticed (Stoddard, etc, 2010; GOAL, 2016), Systems for complaints redress (Stoddard, etc, 2010)(GOAL, 2016; Norman, 2012), Qualitative story telling from beneficiaries (Souness, 2011), and , Community structures that promote beneficiary participation (Norman, 2012).

General Methods: Monitoring in remote operations need to be more intensive and can require significant resources beyond those used in direct management settings, it is needing to design   a clear plan for M&E . There are several general methods and practices to support internal and external M&E initiatives in remote operations. Internal M&E is thought to be less strict than external consultants due to reduced transparency, neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality (Jansury and Moore, 2015).

Internal Monitoring Methods: It contained centralized organizational authority (Schreter and Harmer, 2013). Clear monitoring and reporting procedures, instructions, and advanced planning (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; CDC, 2016). Daily or weekly debriefings (Stoddard, Harmer, 2010). Regular communication between remote managers and field staff (telephone, e-mail, instant messaging, etc.) (Stoddard, Harmer, 2010) (CDC, 2016). Regular written reports with strict deadlines (Stoddard, Harmer, 2010; The University of York, 2006). Date and time stamped, and Global Positioning System (GPS) encrypted photographs of project sites/activities (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; The University of York, 2006; Howe,etc, 2015; IOM, 2008; Zikusooka, etc, 2015).

UNHCR Somalia found that having camera phones, and even taking notes, could be risky in the field, resulting in monitors having to mentally retain information and report it via the internet once they returned home (UNHCR, 2014).

Training to take effective photos is required, they are only useful to assess tangible outcomes (less so for intangible outcomes like social change), and may not always be culturally appropriate (Souness, 2011). Bringing local personnel out of the field for monitoring reviews, technical discussions, coordination meetings, and forward planning (Stoddard, Harmer, 2010). Unplanned visits by senior staff to project sites (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; The University of York, 2006; IOM, 2008). Selection and performance review committees (UNHCR, 2014). Regular strategic surveys that consider the program within changing context (Balslev-Olesen and Hüls, 2011). Simulated technical field visits (Zikusooka and Mose, 2015) Independent INGO/IO and LNGO monitoring for the same program to allow for cross-checking of data.

External Monitoring Methods: It means the independent party (third- party) monitoring via contracting local firms because recruitment from local communities allows monitors to move around without incident (Stoddard and Harmer, 2010; Egeland, and Harmer, 2011; UNICEF EMOPS, 2011; Rivas, 2015; IOM, 2008). Shared third party monitors across the UN system could reduce costs (Rivas, 2015).

Although third party monitoring is considered the best and the most neutral and impartial standard; however, it is an intensive, and expensive resource, and can be compromised through the repeated use of the same firm (Howe, etc, 2015). UNHCR Somalia used simple feedback from people, contractors, and implementers who were in the area but not a part of the program for post-distribution monitoring; it was significantly cheaper than hiring a third- party contractor to be present during the distribution (UNHCR, 2014).

1.4.8. The 'Remote Operations Trap'

The 'remote operations trap' explain the inability of the organization to transition back to traditional management mode after a program has been implemented remotely for some time because of reduced ground-level information, less credibility of the agency, and increased risk for local partners (Stoddard, etc, 2010; ECHO, 2015).

Additional factors to the resistance to returning to direct operating management are: the potentially outdated perception of dangerous areas and risk secondary to a loss of familiarity with the operating environment, a protection-oriented security culture, security costs allocating resources away from more comprehensive programming, and bureaucratic inertia (Stoddard, etc, 2010; Belliveau, 2013). The best way to avoid the remote management trap is continuous reassessment and a pre-planned exit strategy.

1.4.9. Planning and Guidance

Most organizations have no plans for potential partnerships and outsourcing, appropriate situation-specific risk transfer practices or frameworks to support decision making (Collinson, and Duffield, 2013). Programs require contingency plans built into the programming guide, and using formal checklists that dictate when and how to shift to remote model (UNICEF EMOPS, 2011; Steets and Reichhold, 2012). These checklists should consider the security risk assessment, the political and conflict context, stakeholder interests analysis, non-security risk mapping, cost analysis, and exit strategies (UNICEF EMOPS, 2012).

The planning should be included a guidance on partner selection and preparedness process, identifying potential partners that would be appropriate in the event of withdrawal (Stoddard, etc, 2006).

Flexibility needs to be incorporated into the overall strategy, as it has been shown to foster success (UNICEF EMOPS, 2011; Herbert, 2013). It is up to donors to provide flexible funding that is able to adapt to changes in implementation secondary to insecurity (Oxfam International, 2007). Criteria for funding remotely managed programs have also been developed (ECHO, 2015), but need to be more widely adopted. UNHCR Somalia identified a situation where a lack of flexibility resulted in a lost opportunity when IDPs requested assistance with voluntary return, the funding was not immediately available and took six months to authorize, ultimately preventing the assistance of these individuals (UNHCR, 2014).

Additional important components to include in planning and guidance include: Costs of remote management and administration (Rivas, 2015). An effective cluster approach (Rivas, 2015), Team structure (Norman, 2012), Training of national staff (Belliveau, 2013), An assessment of key operational gaps that may occur (Belliveau, 2013). Indicators to guide gradual expansion (Hansen, 2008), Prepositioning of emergency supplies (Oxfam International, 2007), Precise communication instructions (including methods and frequency) (The University of York, 2006), and Remote monitoring.

1.5. The Audit in the Field of Humanitarian Action

The audit in humanitarian action is an accountability mechanism that adopts a stakeholder approach in order to assess the performance of an organization in relation to its aims and those of its stakeholders. One powerful aspect of this audit is that it combines internal stakeholder accountability with an external auditing process. It is also recommended because it combines qualitative and quantitative approaches (Hilhorst, 2002).

Researches explore the use of auditing in the context of regulation of organizations, specifically in cost reporting, where the regulator can order consumer refunds in the case of overstated costs (Baron and Besanko, 1984).

The elements of auditing can be listed as follows (Başpınar, 2005).

1. **<u>Audit is a prosses</u>**: It is going through different steps, and exam all activities implementing between beginning and closed of project.
2. **Claims on economic activity and events**: Reports on the economic activities of the project are issued for business purposes and presented to interested groups. Audit activity investigates the truthfulness and credibility of these advocated claims.
3. **<u>Audit uses pre-agreed criteria:</u>** The auditor decides on accuracy and reliability by comparing the financial statements of the entity's claimed feature with predetermined criteria. The criteria are generally determined by laws, generally accepted accounting standards, agreements or management.
4. **<u>Evaluation of evidence and impartial evidence:</u>** In order to investigate the correctness of the claims made by the operator, auditors independently and independently collect evidence from relevant persons and institutions.
5. **<u>Notification to stakeholders:</u>** This phase is the last stage of the audit and the auditor will disclose the audit to those interested in the operation in the form of a written report at the end of the financial information of the operator.
6. **<u>Provide information about the future:</u>** Providing information whether future business continuity can be maintained by comparing past data. For this reason, the audit also contributes to having information about the future of the organizations.

The topic of auditing has gained importance especially in the world and Turkey recently. With globalization, the concept of audit and the scope of audit are expanded and become more effective. Auditing has a function in terms of business management. When an audit sees all the activities of the entity as a whole, the entity's internal control and accounting systems are examined to identify any faults and deficiencies (Karahan, 2017). Auditing is the setting up of an organization's activities to ensure that its results are in accordance with the plans, and taking the necessary precautions when the results are compared to those standards and the practices differ from the plan (Sanal, 2002). The fact that supervision is part of the administration should not be forgotten. An audit-free management process is unthinkable. As a matter of fact, it can be understood that the work done is not complete (Karahan, 2017).

Audit in any organization can be upsides and downsides and have a system, methods and mechanisms o achieve the goal from auditing. And it is necessary for auditors to provide guidance on creating these management and control mechanisms before audits are even contemplated.

The audit decision-making must be carefully scrutinized the risk assessment, the perfect time to do the auditing, safty and security issues, the most important activities must to audit, kind of auditing reports, and type of auditing (internal or external) (Renner, 2006).

2. LIMITATIONS

This review literature on remote monitoring and auditing of humanitarian programs in conflict settings highlighted many themes and issues spanning through multiple domains: humanitarian principles, partnerships, risks, advocacy, accountability, the 'remote operations trap', and planning guidance, and auditing.

One of the main limitations found throughout this review was that the literature focused on INGO/IO perspectives, with little information on the experiences of national and local staff,

An additional limitation was that review did not discuss the costs of managing, monitoring and auditing remote projects

The most of documents pertaining to this subject were a case studies, a study type considered to be the lowest on the hierarchy of evidence (Concato, 2004). This limitation was exacerbated by the lack of detail throughout the literature, often attributed to organizations not wanting to discuss specific methods for fear of contributing to increased security risk; resultantly. Therefore, some of case studies were presented with all the details available but still lack much-desired information.

3. CONCLUSIONS

This review shows that, in spite of, many organizations are participating in remote programming or monitoring, but few articulate their experiences in writing to disseminate lessons learned directly to other organizations or stakeholders, or to be available generally to guide future operations.

There is need to study of the requirements and needs of local partners who implement projects and the challenges they face, as well as studies of needing the organizations to develop the methods of auditing, and write the lessons learned about it.

Finally, there is real need for guidelines and tools in both monitoring and auditing to assist agencies in applying best practices in remote programming, and can be used to improve humanitarian aid delivery in inaccessible conflict settings.

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